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North. This will have long-term economic consequences for the South but also for the North through the changing of 
international capital flows. To study the latter, we build a simple two-region two-period OLG model, assuming fully integrated 
financial markets. This allows us to determine the analytical expression of the world interest rate dynamics at general 
equilibrium and the resulting capital flows accruing to each of the two regions (the North and the South). From there, we 
analyse how a reduction in either fertility or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital flows. Contradictory 
effects are evidenced. To clear up any ambiguity and to study the South's demographic transition, which involves a 
succession of shocks, we propose numerical simulations. Even if the results stress that the institutional context and 
technological catching-up may matter, they suggest in a rather general way that the declines in both fertility and mortality 
tend to reduce the relative capital needs of the Southern economies and consequently their capital inflows. This, in turn, 
would be beneficial to the North's productive capacity, which should then hold more capital. 
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Abstract
In the coming decades, the countries of the South will be facing the aging of
the population faster than the countries of the North. This will have long-term
economic consequences for the South but also for the North through the changing
of international capital ows. To study the latter, we build a simple two-region
two-period OLG model, assuming fully integrated nancial markets. This allows us
to determine the analytical expression of the world interest rate dynamics at general
equilibrium and the resulting capital ows accruing to each of the two regions (the
North and the South). From there, we analyse how a reduction in either fertility
or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital ows. Contradictory
e¤ects are evidenced. To clear up any ambiguity and to study the Souths de-
mographic transition, which involves a succession of shocks, we propose numerical
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simulations. Even if the results stress that the institutional context and technologi-
cal catching-up may matter, they suggest in a rather general way that the declines in
both fertility and mortality tend to reduce the relative capital needs of the Southern
economies and consequently their capital inows. This, in turn, would be benecial
to the Norths productive capacity, which should then hold more capital.
Keywords: International capital ows, OLG, demographic transition.
JEL codes: D91, F40, J10, O33.
1 Introduction
Population aging, caused by increased longevity and decreased fertility, has been, and
still is, extensively investigated in developed countries, called hereafter the North, in
particular through its impact on social security. Figure 1-b1 shows that the weight of social
security is expected to increase from 8% of GDP in 2010 to 10% at mid-century. However,
in many respects the Northern economies have essentially completed their demographic
transition, as illustrated by their low population growth (Fig. 1-a2). The forthcoming
world population aging will mainly be driven by the South, a set of less developed and
emerging economies. As can be seen on Fig. 1-a1, relatively to the Norths, life expectancy
in the South is increasing more rapidly, its fertility rate decreasing even more rapidly. As
a direct consequence, the old-age dependency ratio in the South, which measures the
number of elderly people as a share of those of working age, is rising more rapidly (Fig.
1-a3). Besides, its social security contribution rate, currently around 50% of the North,
is expected to reach 80% at mid-century (Fig. 1-b2). Moreover, the Souths demographic
transition, in contrast with that of the North, is occuring in a context of increasing capital
mobility between North and South. For example, the Foreign Direct Investment (net)
2
inows and outows in the Northern countries amounted yearly to 1100 and 1400 billion
dollars over the 2007-2016 period against 71 and 91 billion dollars over the 1980s (IMF,
current US$). In this context, the Souths demographic transition will not only impact
the domestic economies but is also set to have consequences on the Northern economies
through changing international capital ows.
Characterized by a double demographic shift that has opposite consequences on the
size of populations, the overall impact of the Souths demographic transition is not
straightforward to assess. On the one hand, the decline in fertility that reduces the
number of births is a negative demographic shock. On the other hand, the decline in
mortality, by increasing life expectancy, embodies a positive demographic shock. To dis-
entangle the specic impacts of each demographic component, we develop a two-region
two-period OLG model of the world economy with strong heterogeneity between the two
regions (the North and the South) and fully integrated capital markets. This regional
heterogeneity includes demographic, economic and institutional di¤erences. Hence, we
assume that each region has specic levels for the fertility rate, life expectancy, social
security size and total factor productivity. In this framework, we determine the analytical
expression of the interest rate dynamics at the general equilibrium and the resulting cap-
ital ows accruing to each of the two regions. The two components of the demographic
transition, operating through di¤erent channels, are likely to reduce the Souths capital
inows. First, the decline in fertility reduces the capital requirements of the Southern
economies due to a lower growth of their labor force. Second, a longer life expectancy
increases the need for life-cycle savings, which in turn lessens the need for foreign capital.
However, we shed light on the potential contradictory e¤ects induced by the adjustment
of PAYG pension systems and the evolution of the interest rate at general equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Demographic and institutional evolutions: the South in comparison with the
North (source: United Nations, 2017, Clements et al., 2011, and authorscalculations - see
Appendix A). Pension contributions expressed as a percentage of the related pensionable
salary. Gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings.
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For example, if the size of the pension system swells in the South to adjust to population
aging, domestic savings is reduced. The overall impact on the regional capital allocation
appears ambiguous. To clear up this ambiguity, numerical simulations are used. They
conrm, for the majority of congurations, the pre-eminence of the rst two e¤ects: the
two components of the demographic transition are likely to reduce Southern capital in-
ows. This, in turn, would be benecial to the productive capacity of the North, which
should then hold more capital. Nevertheless, note that if an increased life expectancy
leads to a postponement of the retirement age, that would leave the relative need for
capital unchanged. Note also that the technological development context inuences the
magnitude of the impacts. Thus, we show that if the technological catching-up is low
enough, the impact of the demographic transition may lead to an increase in the Souths
relative need for capital.
The issue tackled in this article has been partly addressed in applied versions of multi-
regional and multi-period OLG models. It is worth noting that this literature has mainly
focused on the end of the Norths demographic transition (Börsch-Supan et al., 2002;
Fehr et al., 2003; Feroli, 2003; Domeij and Flodén, 2006; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007), by
considering how social security reforms would a¤ect the international capital ows. Taking
explicitly into account the demography of the Southern economies, as in Aglietta et al.
(2002, 2007), Fehr et al. (2005), Marchiori (2011) and Attanasio et al. (2007), clearly
makes the job harder in these "big" computational models, for at least two reasons.
First, the unavailability or unreliability of data in many developing countries possibly
renders calibration irrelevant. Second, the number of factors likely to impact the results
increases. For example, productivity in the developing countries is currently lower than
in the developed countries. But for how long? In the long run, it is necessary to consider
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the way in which the developing South is technologically catching up with the developed
North, with the expectation that the characteristics of the selected process1 will have
a signicant impact on the simulated results. From this perspective, the use of a two-
region two-period OLG model allows us to have a clearer analytical understanding of the
di¤erent factors that determine the direction of international capital ows.
The two-region two-period OLG framework of the world economy (represented as a
closed system), rst proposed by Fried (1980) and Buiter (1981), has mainly been used
in its two-sector version to study the consequences of economic openness on sectorial
specialization and on welfare (Galor and Lin, 1994; Mountford, 1998; Guilló, 2001; Sayan,
2005; Naito and Zhao, 2009; Song et al. 2011; Yakita, 2012). As to the demographic
issue, Sayan (2005) and Naito and Zhao (2009) show that, after openness, the low-fertility
region, becoming relatively scarce in labor, specializes in and exports the capital-intensive
good. More closely related to our work, in one-sector models, Adema et al. (2008),
Ito and Tabata (2010), Eugeni (2015) and Bárány et al.2 (2015) consider the role of
social security in explaining the direction of international capital ows. This theoretical
literature stresses, if it is assumed the two regions are similar except in the size of their
PAYG social security, that capital ows from the region with the smaller social security
because it saves more than its counterpart. This is what Adema et al. (2008) coin the
"negative international spillover e¤ects" of PAYG systems. Whereas Adema et al. (2008)
and Bárány et al. (2015) are interested in the impact of symmetric aging, Ito and Tabata
(2010) consider asymmetric aging but only in the case of longevity since di¤erent fertility
1In Aglietta et al. (2002, 2007) and Fehr et al. (2005), the long run technological catching-up is fully
achieved in level (-convergence), but only partially in Marchiori (2011). In Attanasio et al. (2007), the
technological convergence is in rate (-convergence), not in level.
2In a three-period model.
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rates induce technical di¢ culties. In e¤ect, when the population of one region is assumed
to grow always faster than the others, it ends by being innitely larger. In that case, a
small open economy coexists with a large open economy that determines alone the world
interest rate. To that extent, the world capital market clearing is determined as if the
large economy were in autarky. The resulting stationary state is no longer characteristic
of two-way interacting economies. Dealing with demographic transition, where South
fertility converges to the Norths, allows us to overcome this di¢ culty. More explicitly,
we study the regional decrease in fertility and its long term spillover e¤ect relatively to
the after-transition stationary state. Adopting this strategy, we show that a regional
decreased fertility is likely -qualitatively- similar to a regional increased longevity by
generating, ceteris paribus, capital outows from the aging country. Note that Bárány et
al. (2015) nd similar results by considering a second conguration where the equivalent
of our South is a small open economy in demographic transition. Compared to their
approach, we are able to show that aging in one region exerts positive spillover e¤ects on
the non-aging one.
We also extend the literature studying capital ows in two-region two-period models by
considering individuals work for a fraction of their second life period. In e¤ect, that allows
social security to be realistically balanced through adjusting the retirement age along with
the pension contribution and replacement rates. We show that keeping unchanged the
social security size, not only through decreased pensions as in Adema et al. (2008) but
also through postponed retirement age, reduces the spillover e¤ects induced by aging.
Moreover, this extension, contrasting with Bárány et al. (2015), allows us to study the
case where pensions in the South become as generous as in the North. As suggested
by the data collected by Clements et al. (2011), it is strongly relevant to deal with the
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issue of social security convergence in the emerging countries3. Not only is the southern
contribution rate expected to increase to 80% of that of the North at mid-century (Fig.
1-b2), but their replacement rates appear similar as early as 2030 (Fig. 1-b3).
In recent years, most of the literature devoted to nancial markets and the allocation
of capital has focused on the Lucas (1990) paradox, namely the lack of capital ows from
rich to poor countries that are expected to o¤er higher returns. The observed upstream
capital ows and global imbalances, amounting to 0:62% of world GDP on average over
the last decade4, have led to explanations rooted in di¤erences in public expenditure
(Eugeni, 2015), in time preference (Aglietta et al, 2002 and 2007), in nancial rigidities
(Song et al., 2011; Reinhardt et al., 2013; Curdacier et al., 2015) or in asset riskiness
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Wang et al. (2015)
suppose a higher risk-free interest rate in developed economies. As a result, security-
seeking capital ows massively spread northward, while the search for high but risky
returns induces a net positive ow from North to South. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
term the overpoise of security research in the allocation of global savings "the allocation
puzzle". In this line, in our model with fully integrated capital markets, the initial gap
prevailing in the benchmark scenario between risk-free interest rates addresses the Lucas
paradox and generates upstream capital ows when openness occurs. Note that, as soon
as the next period, the ows are reversed, i.e. that the Lucas paradox disappears. This
3For example, in 2006, the Chinese government launched an economic change more focused on social
equality than growth. The Chinese economy is currently su¤ering from an unequal access to social
insurance between rural and urban sectors. Extending social security to a larger population is then a big
challenge in terms of welfare and generational impacts (Song et al., 2015 ; Bairoliya et al., 2018).
4We have used the current account balance in the South (IMF, Emerging market and developing
economies) and world GDP (in current US dollars) to compute the capital ows as a percentage of world
GDP. The 0:62% value then corresponds to the 9-year moving average centered on 2010.
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prediction seems consistent with the trend estimated by the IMF for the 2020s, amounting
to 0:22% of world GDP (9-year moving average centered on 2020). This trend may reveal
a less prominent search for security, or a decrease in the perceived risk associated with
investing in the South. It may also mirror the continued tendency towards capital account
liberalization worldwide, put forward by Reinhardt et al. (2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the analytical
properties of the equilibrium in an open economy. We analyse how a reduction in either
fertility or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital ows. Contradictory
e¤ects are evidenced. In section 3, we then propose a benchmark scenario calibrated on
data to investigate the impact of the demographic transition. No consideration is given to
the North-South technological gap, leaving it to section 4, which is devoted to scrutinizing
how our results are sensitive to the speed of catching-up. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
The world is divided into 2 regions, one developed - hereafter called the North - the other
emerging, hereafter called the South. Each region hosts three categories of economic
agents: households, rms, and a public sector.
Households are composed of two adults of the same generation. Their life spans over
two periods. In the rst period, each household works, consumes, saves and does not value
leisure. The second period breaks into two subperiods. The rst one is dedicated to work
and consumption while the second subperiod is retirement time when people consume
their savings and their pension income. Households are supposed to maximize lifecycle
utility. Their savings is invested in one nancial asset, an ownership title in the rms
productive capital.
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The productive sector is modelled as a set of perfectly competitive rms that produce
a single good relying on a technology combining capital and labor. It can be consumed
or invested. At the optimum, the production factors are remunerated at their marginal
productivity. The good and the nancial assets are freely traded on perfectly competitive
markets.
The public sector is reduced to an unfunded (PAYG) pension scheme (social security),
which nances the pension benets of retirees by taxing the earnings of current workers.
2.1 Households
Each household lives for two periods, respectively denoted "young" and "old", whose
length is normalized to one. At each period t and for a given region i, growth in the
number of young adults is characterized by:
Ni;t
Ni;t 1
= Gi;t (1)
where Ni;t denotes the corresponding number of young adults in period t. Assuming
households are composed of two parents, Gi;t corresponds also to half the fertility rate net
of child mortality. Old people live only a fraction of the second period5 denoted i;t+1  1.
Overall life expectancy is then measured by: 1 + i;t+1:
When young in t, people work, consume and save income for the second period of their
life. In addition, they contribute to a PAYG retirement system. Their rst period budget
constraint is then:
5Note that, in order to avoid the annuity puzzle, we have modelled without loss of generality life length
as a deterministic process.
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Ci;t + Si;t = (1   i;t)wi;t (2)
where Ci;t denotes consumption when young, Si;t the savings, wi;t the wage and  i;t the
pension contribution rate.
When old in t+1, individuals go on working during a fraction li;t+1 of their second life
period (mandatory length of work and/or legal retirement age) and they consume all their
income, which is equal to their savings with interest, their net wage during the period
they work and their due pension for the rest of their lives. The second period budget
constraint is then:
i;t+1Zi;t+1 = (1   i;t+1)wi;t+1li;t+1 +Ri;t+1Si;t +
 
i;t+1   li;t+1

Pi;t+1 (3)
where Zi;t+1 denotes the consumption when old in t + 1, Ri;t+1 the interest factor and
Pi;t+1 the pension. The latter is dened as:
Pi;t+1 = i;t+1wi;t+1 (4)
where i;t+1 is the (gross) replacement rate in region i in period t+ 1.
Young individuals in t are characterized by the following expected lifetime utility
function:
u (Ci;t) + i;t+1u (Zi;t+1) (5)
where  < 1 denotes the discount factor and u is an increasing function. This specic
lifetime utility with mortality component in the retirement period is based on Yaari (1965),
as in Adema et al. (2008), Ito and Tabata (2010) and Bárány et al. (2015).
11
The maximization of utility (5) under constraints (2) and (3) gives the following FOC:
u0 (Ci;t) = Ri;t+1u0 (Zi;t+1) :
Denote by

i;t = (1   i;t)wi;t + bi;t+1 wi;t+1Ri;t+1 (6)
the lifetime income of the young where
bi;t+1 = (1   i;t+1) li;t+1 +
 
i;t+1   li;t+1

i;t+1 (7)
is a relative indicator of the net future income. Assuming that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is constant and equal to one with u = log (), this yields according to eq.
(6) that savings is an increasing function of the net current income and a decreasing
function of the future discounted income (wage and pension) and can be expressed as:
Si;t = (1   i;t)wi;t   
i;t1+ (8)
= si;t (1   i;t)wi;t   (1  si;t) bi;t+1 wi;t+1Ri;t+1
where si;t =
i;t+1
1+i;t+1
denotes the marginal propensity to save the current income and
(1  si;t) the marginal propensity to consume the future income. This marginal propensity
to save is an increasing function of life expectancy and a subjective discount factor.
2.2 Social security
Social security is managed through a PAYG pension scheme. Assuming the retirement
system budget is balanced in each period, it follows that:
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(Ni;t +Ni;t 1li;t)  i;twi;t =
 
i;t   li;t

Ni;t 1Pi;t: (9)
When considering the population evolution process dened by eq. (1) and social
securitys balanced budget (9), the three social security parameters  i;t, i;t and li;t are
linked by the relation:
i;t
 
i;t   li;t

= (Gi;t + li;t)  i;t: (10)
Everything else being equal, this equation highlights the social security budget decit
generated by population aging, either through decreased resources if fertility decreases, or
through increased spending if mortality decreases. In both cases, the return to a balanced
budget requires pension benet reductions, contribution rises, or delayed retirement.
2.3 Firms
There is a single homogenous good in the world. It is produced in each region and in each
period according to a Cobb-Douglas technology Yi;t = fi;t (Ki;t; Li;t) = Ai;tKi;tL
1 
i;t , where
Yi;t denotes the output, Ai;t the total factor productivity (TFP), Ki;t the capital stock
and Li;t the labor. Assuming total depletion of capital over the period and a perfectly
competitive production sector, prot maximization yields the productive factors to be
remunerated at their marginal productivity such that:
8>><>>:
Ri;t = @fi;t (:) =@Ki;t = Ai;tk
 1
i;t
wi;t = @fi;t (:) =@Li;t = Ai;t (1  ) ki;t
(11)
where ki;t =
Ki;t
Li;t
denotes the capital-to-labor ratio. Hereafter, we will use interchangeably
the interest factor (Ri;t) and return to capital (@fi;t (:) =@Ki;t).
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2.4 Open-economy equilibrium and capital ows
In order to ease the presentation of the open-economy equilibrium, consider rst the case
of two closed economies in which in every period labor markets must clear at equilibrium:
Li;t = Ni;t +Ni;t 1li;t = (Gi;t + li;t)Ni;t 1, 8i;8t (12)
as well as nancial markets:
Ki;t+1 = Ni;tSi;t, 8i;8t: (13)
By denition of such an equilibrium, the capital ows at any date t and in each region i
measured by KFi;t = Ki;t+1   Ni;tSi;t are nil. From eqs. (1) and (8) (13) we can then
show that the dynamic general equilibrium is specied by:
Ri;t+1 = R

i;t
1 
i;t ; 8i and 8t (14)
where i;t =

(1+A^i;t+1)[(Gi;t+1+li;t+1)+(1 )(1 si;t)bi;t+1]
(1 )si;t(1  i;t)

and 1 + A^i;t+1 =

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1 
. i;t
captures the regional relative tension between the demand (numerator) and supply (de-
nominator) of capital. At steady state, it yieldsRi = i, 8i, wherei =

(1+A^i)[(Gi+li)+(1 )(1 si)bi]
(1 )si(1  i)

:
We now turn to a nancially globalized economy. The good and the nancial asset
are freely traded on perfectly competitive world markets. There is neither money nor
non-tradable local goods. The PPP condition is satised. Workers are immobile making
both labor markets local as in eq. (12). The capital market must clear in each period at
equilibrium such that:
X
i
Ki;t+1 =
X
i
Ni;tSi;t, 8t: (15)
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From eqs. (1), (8) (12) and (15), we then show (see Appendix B):
Proposition 1: At general equilibrium, the world interest factor, denoted Rt, can be
expressed as a geometric average of the past interest factor and a convex combination of
the regional tensions between the demand and supply of capital:
Rt+1 = R

t 
1 
t (16)
where t = 'tS;t + (1  't) N;t; 't =
sS;t(1 S;t)S;tA
1
1 
S;tP
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
2 (0; 1] and i;t = Ni;tP
iNi;t
is
the share of region i in the worlds youth population, and R0 is given.
t captures the world tension between the demand and supply of capital, expressed as
a convex combination of the two regional tensions. It means rst, everything else being
equal, that the world tension increases whenever tension rises in one of the regions. This
is also the case if the weight of the region experiencing the higher tension increases. By
allowing labor supply in the second period of life, eq. (16) extends the specication of the
world interest rate dynamics obtained in Le Cacheux and Touzé (2003) and in Krueger
and Ludwig (2007).
In a two-region world model, the equilibrium condition (15) can be rewritten as a
capital ow from the North (excess of savings:  KFN;t = NN;tSN;t   KN;t+1) to the
South in order to cover an excess of capital demand (KFS;t = KS;t+1 NS;tSS;t): KFS;t =
 KFN;t, for all t:
Proposition 2: If capital markets are fully integrated, capital in a region i ows at date
t in response to the interest rate di¤erence ~Ri;t+1 Rt+1 such that KFi;t = 0 is equivalent
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to ~Ri;t+1 = Rt+1, where ~Ri;t+1 is the closed-economy equivalent interest factor.
This proposition is central to understand our subsequent results, since it allows us
to interpret all the capital ows as a di¤erence in regional returns. The ~Ri;t+1 > Rt+1
condition expresses a higher return in economy i, hence prot opportunity for foreign
capital. The latter will then ow to this economy, resulting in a positive net inow. By
way of consequence, this regions capital return will diminish. The reverse happens in the
region from which capital ows out. Were the markets perfectly integrated, ows would
stabilize when regional returns are equal, thus dening a unique world interest rate. This
puts an end to arbitrage opportunities. Note that it can also be interpreted as a di¤erence
in tensions on the regional capital markets. The interest factor ~Ri;t+1 corresponds to the
capital return that would be observed if the economy were in autarky in period t + 1,
contingent on the fact that capital markets are fully integrated in period t with interest
factor Rt. It follows from eq. (14) that ~Ri;t+1 = Rt 
1 
i;t , implying that ~Ri;t+1 = Rt+1 is
equivalent to i;t = t. As t is expressed as a convex combination of the two regional
tensions (Proposition 1), the direction of capital ows is also determined by the sign of
the gap between these tensions: KFi;t = 0, i;t =  i;t.
2.5 The transmission channels of demographic changes
The demographic changes a¤ect the economic activity and the world allocation of capi-
tal. Our model allows us to distinguish three transmission channels: the microeconomic
tradeo¤s (savings and investment), the social security balancing and the world capital
market equilibrium.
First, the demographic shocks impact the population size along with the savings and
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investment. More precisely, a drop in fertility leads to a reduction in the number of
savers (the young) and in the number of workers. Both the domestic demand and supply
for capital decrease. The reduced labor force results in a lower marginal productivity
of capital, which in turn leads to a decline in the capital per worker. It is then likely,
ceteris paribus, that the demand for capital decreases more than supply so that less foreign
capital is required by the South. On the other hand, each individual, living longer, will
have to save more to sustain his consumption when old. Again, the South needs less
foreign capital here because the supply of domestic capital is increased for an unchanged
demand, everything else being equal.
This analysis of the e¤ect of demographic changes on world capital allocation is made
thornier if one takes into account the social security adjustment induced by population
aging, which corresponds to the second highlighted channel. Increased longevity and re-
duced fertility implying, respectively, more pensioners and relatively less contributors,
social security budget requires to be balanced either through an increase in the contribu-
tion,  > 0, or a pension reduction,  < 0, or the postponing of the legal retirement
age, l > 0. By lowering the disposable income in both life periods, the rst adjust-
ment has an ambiguous e¤ect on individual savings. By cutting the pension benets,
the second adjustment reinforces incentives to save for retirement. The third adjustment
implies more revenues in the second life period so that incentives to save are lowered. In
addition, the growing labor force causes an increasing demand for capital. Provided the
social adjustment leads to a reduction in the pension benets, the two combined channels
permit to assert that the expected demographic changes in the South will decrease its
need for external capital. Otherwise, it is indeterminate.
Taking into account only these rst two channels would be tantamount to consider-
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ing that demographic changes in the South would not a¤ect prices. In other words, it
would be like viewing the southern economy as a small open economy with a negligible
demo-economic weight ('  0) so that its demographic changes would entail no signicant
impact either at the world market level or on the other region of the world. So, as the
South cannot reasonably be considered as such, we must contemplate the third channel,
through which demographic changes convey price changes on domestic and international
markets, and particularly the world interest rate. Assume for example that the demo-
graphic changes reduce the need for capital in the South, everything else being equal. In
that case, the lowered tension on the South capital market reduces the tension on the
world capital market, leading to a decline in the world interest rate. In turn, the latter
a¤ects the economic decisions both in the South and the North. A weaker interest rate
entails two e¤ects. First, people are less prone to saving. Second, by making investments
less costly in the South, it boosts the demand for capital. This feedback e¤ect being of
second order in the South, it can not reverse the primary e¤ect, i.e. the decreased need
of external capital from the South. It is not as such a source of ambiguity. However,
demographic changes in the South may also a¤ect the world capital market tension and
the world interest rate through the change in the South demo-economic weight. This
e¤ect not being caused by a change in the domestic tensions in the South, we can no
longer assert that it is of second importance in the overall result. That may eventually
create a new source of ambiguity.
It is worth noting that, even if by denition the capital ow entering a region leaves the
other region, the demographic changes we examine does not characterize a zero-sum game
in terms of capital, as it exhibits an externality. To see this more explicitly, and to neutral-
ize the pure demographic e¤ect of the shocks, dene ~kt+1 =
Kt+1
S;t+1A
1
1 
S;t+1+(1 S;t+1)A
1
1 
N;t+1

Lt+1
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to be the capital by unit of e¢ cient labor at the world level, where S;t+1 =
LS;t+1
Lt+1
and
Lt+1 = LS;t+1+LN;t+1. In a zero-sum game context, this ratio should not be a¤ected by the
capital ows induced by aging. However, from eq. (11), this yields ~kt+1 = 
1
1 R

 1
t 
 1
t .
Therefore, as the expected demographic changes in the South in period t alter the world
capital market tension from the previous period, it modies ~kt. More specically, it is
shown that if the tension on the world capital market is decreased, this results in a higher
capital by unit of e¢ cient labor at the world level.
In Appendix C we specify and thoroughly analyse the case of a non-permanent an-
ticipated shock. Even in this simple case, we highlight a massive indeterminacy in the
global impact on the regional capital allocation when taking into account the above three
channels. However, the process of demographic transition involves a succession of shocks,
possibly leading to a stable population. For indeterminacy to be cleared up, numerical
simulations are proposed in the next section to study the impact of the South demographic
transition.
3 Decomposing the impact of demographic transition
in the South: a numerical exploration
To decompose the impact of demographic transition in the South, we proceed in two
steps. First, we compute a benchmark scenario based on the available data. Let us
stress that this scenario assumes that the South social security adjustment induced by
demographic transition is not conveyed through the pension replacement rate but through
both postponing the legal retirement age lS and increasing the pension contribution rate
S.
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After computing the benchmark scenario, we study the specic e¤ect of fertility reduc-
tion by comparing the benchmark scenario with one assuming the fertility is unchanged.
As social security can be adjusted through a change in the legal retirement age or in the
contribution rate to keep the pension replacement rate unchanged, we consider these two
alternative cases separately. We proceed in the same way to study the specic impact of
a mortality reduction.
3.1 A benchmark scenario
Assume rst that a period spreads over 30 years. Supposing individuals enter the job
market at 20 and, following the demographic features of 2010, we set N = 1 in the North,
which corresponds to a 60-year lifespan at 20 (United Nations, 2017). Thereafter, as life
expectancy at 20 is nearly 53 years in the South, we set
1+S;0
2
= 53
60
; then S;0 = 0:764.
From the United Nations (2017), the share of the world population aged between 20 and
49 in the South was 87% in 2010. Accordingly, at the initial period, we set NN;0 = 13
and NS;0 = 87. In addition, the share of the world population aged between 20 and 49 in
the South was 80% in 1980, i.e. NS; 1
NS; 1+NN; 1
= 0:8. Fixing from the beginning a stable
population in the North, i.e. GN = 1, the relative increase in the young population in the
South as compared to the North gives the following equation NS; 1
NS; 1+NN; 1
=
NS;0
GS;0
NS;0
GS;0
+NN;0
=
0:8. With NN;0 = 13 and NS;0 = 87, this then leads to GS;0 = 1:62. With these values,
the structure of the world population is satisfyingly reproduced for the rst period of the
model (2010) as exhibited in Table 1.
To characterize the demographic transition in the South, we assume that both its
mortality and fertility rates converge towards the stationary levels prevailing in the North,
which is supposed to have already completed its transition. Here, GS;t corresponds to half
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the fertility rate (net of child mortality), and 1+S;t is life expectancy at 20. The increased
life expectancy in the South is then described by
S;t
S;t 1
= 

S;t 1 and the decrease in its
fertility rate evolves as follows: GS;t
GS;t 1
= GGS;t 1 for t  1,  and G denoting respectively
the speed convergence of life expectancy and fertility towards a stable population. Note
that if these speeds are nil, there is no demographic transition, whereas the transition
ends after one period if they are equal to one. Speed G is chosen to reproduce the share
of the world population aged between 20 and 49 in the South as forecast by the United
Nations (2017) for 2040, 2070 and 2100. The results described in Table 1 obtain with
G = 0:5, which characterizes a fast convergence towards the steady-state fertility level,
that is, 2 children per woman. We then set  = 0:215 to account for the share of the
world population over 20 in the South, which reects a lower mortality convergence speed
than the one prevailing for fertility. The respective evolutions of the fertility rate and life
expectancy in the South are given in Figure 2a. Using this simple method to evaluate the
structure of the world population after 2100 leads to the stabilization of the share of the
world population over 20 in the South at 91:6%.
Years 2010 2040 2070 2100
Population (t = 0) (t = 1) (t = 2) (t = 3)
Aged between 20 and 49 Model 87 89.5 90.5 91.1
UN data 87 89.9 90.8 91.1
Over 20 Model 83.1 87.4 89 90.3
UN data 83.2 87 88 89.8
Table 1. Calibration of the demographic transition:
Souths share of the world population
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Besides, we assume a 0:99 annual discount time factor, so that  = 0:9930  0:74. As
usual, we set capitals share in output to  = 0:3. Put under pressure by population aging,
social security in the South must adjust. Di¤erent options are available: postponing the
legal retirement age, raising the pension contribution rate, reducing the pension benets,
or any combination of the three. As suggested in Fig 1-b3, pension benets from 2010
should stabilize at a gross replacement rate S = 30%. In addition, even if stabilization in
the North takes place a little later than in the South, the same level of pension indexing
(N = 30%) also appears relevant for the former. For these reasons, we assume for both
regions a permanent 30% gross replacement rate. Assuming the legal retirement age is
65 in the North, i.e. lN = 0:5, the required contribution rate N for a balanced budget
(eq. 4) is then about 10% (against 11:7% actually observed in 2010). In the South, in the
rst period, as the social security size is 49% of the Norths (Fig. 1-b2), i.e. S;0 = 4:9%,
the legal retirement age allowing pension benets to be nanced with a balanced budget
corresponds to a little less than 63 years, or lS;0 = 0:429. We set the TFP in the North
AN = 100 as the technological leader. To mimic the near 25% South-to-North ratio of
GDP per capita (see appendix A), we set AS = 28:2. Moreover, this benchmark scenario
considers that there is neither technological innovation in the North nor technological
convergence of the South with the North: A^N = A^S = 0.
Assuming a 30% gross replacement rate in the South implies that the required ad-
justments in its retirement system consist in delaying the legal retirement age or raising
the contribution rate. From Fig. 1-b2, the relative size of the pension scheme in the
South is expected to increase from 49% in 2010 to 68% in 2040. From that perspective,
we assume that the contribution rate converges with the Norths, according to an exoge-
nous dynamics described by S;t
S;t 1
=

N
S;t 1

,  denoting the speed of institutional
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convergence. This leads to  = 0:44. Thereafter, the legal retirement age in the South
will be supposed to adjust endogenously to maintain both a balanced budget and an un-
changed gross replacement rate (t;S = 30%; for all t). The corresponding evolutions of
the contribution rate and the legal retirement age are given in Fig. 2b.
Finally, assuming the return to capital (before tax) calculated by Piketty (2013) for
the period 1950-2012 is characteristic of the Norths, we set RN;0 = 5:3%. Also, we set the
risk-free return to capital in the South at RS;0 = 3:14% so as to reproduce a net capital
outow in the South amounting to 0:62% of world GDP in 2010 (9-year moving average
centered on 2010), as specied in the introduction.
  R0 (% yearly) A0 A^
North (N) 0.3 0.74 5.3 100 0
South (S) 0.3 0.74 3.14 28.2 0
a. Economic parameters
0  G0 G N0
North (N) 1 - 1 - 13
South (S) 0.83 0.215 1.62 0.5 87
b. Demographic parameters
 0 (%)  l0 0 (%)
North (N) 10 - 0.5 30
South (S) 4.9 0.44 0.429 30
c. Social security parameters
Table 2. Calibration
In our simulation, reecting the Lucas Paradox in line with Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013) and Wang et al. (2015), a positive capital owing from the South to the North is
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observed in period 0 because, one period after opening, the (equivalent) closed-economy
risk-free interest rate in the North is still higher than in the South (Proposition 2). These
upstream capital ows contribute to explain the fall in the interest rate observed over the
past 25 years in the industrial world (see Eggertsson et al., 2019). This global imbalance
does not last, due to the swap of the relative positions of the two closed-economy interest
rates. In e¤ect, from the second period on, capital ows are directed from the North to
the South (Fig. 2d). However, the benchmark scenario evidences that the interest rate
should go on decreasing due to the fast aging of the South population. Afterwards, these
positive ows in percentage of world GDP are decreasing and become insignicant after
period 7.
As a matter of fact, with the population in the South converging towards a similar
demographic structure as the Norths, and the same trend prevailing for pension schemes,
both closed-economies converge towards the same interest rate. As exhibited by equation
R =
h
[(1+l)+(1 )(1 s)b]
(1 )s(1 )
i
characterizing the closed-economy interest rate at steady state,
the di¤erent TFP levels in the two regions (AS and AN) do not imply that their interest
rates di¤er. As put forward by Proposition 2, capital ows then dry up.
3.2 The specic e¤ects of the reduction in fertility
To study the specic e¤ects of the reduction in fertility, we now compare the benchmark
scenario with one assuming an unchanged fertility.
The e¤ects of the drop in fertility GS;t in the South are unveiled primarily through the
induced decline in its labor force growth leading to a decrease in both capital productivity
and demand for capital. This results in a twofold decrease in the world interest rate (Fig.
3a) and in capital inows to South (Fig. 3c).
24
0 5 10 15
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
a) South demographic transition (relative to North)
South life expectancy (% of North)
South fertility (% of North)
0 5 10 15
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
c) Return to capital (annual, %)
South (closed)
North (closed)
Financially integrated w orld
0 5 10 15
-0.6
-0.3
0
0.3
d) Capital inflows to South (% of World GDP)
0 5 10 15
50
60
70
80
90
100
b) South retirement system adjustments (GRR=30%)
Contribution rate (% of North)
Retirement age (% of North)
Figure 2: The benchmark scenario
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Figure 3: The specic e¤ects of fertility decline in the South depending on the retirement
system adjustment (GRR=30%)
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Note that when capital ows are evaluated in percentage of world GDP as in Fig. 3c,
the fertility reduction seems to have no e¤ect on them at steady state. On the one hand,
as already described in the benchmark scenario, the convergence of population and social
security structures equalizes the equivalent closed-economy regional interest rates, thus
ending capital ows (Proposition 2). On the other hand, when the South population goes
on growing for ever, the world demographic share of the North becomes negligible and
world GDP tends to innity. Hence, the capital ows expressed as a share of world GDP
tend to zero. Also, as the world interest rate decreases, the saving rates in the South and
in the North are shown to decrease (Fig. 3b).
As exhibited in Fig. 3, the e¤ects of the drop in fertility GS;t in the South must also
be analyzed through the decline in the ratio of contributors (workers) to beneciaries (re-
tirees), that is, the dependency ratio
S;t lS;t
GS;t+lS;t
. Induced aging puts pressure on pension sys-
tems to adjust. Maintaining the replacement rate S;t at 30%, where S;t =
GS;t+lS;t
(S;t lS;t)
S;t,
then requires, everything else being equal, either a progressive increase up to 3 percent-
age points in the retirement contribution rate  i;t (Fig. 3, left column) or a progressive
increase up to 15 percentage points in the working period lS;t (Fig. 3, right column).
The increase in the contribution rate reduces workersdisposable income, which in turn
contributes to reducing their savings to maintain their level of consumption when young.
This fall in the saving rate is however insu¢ cient to o¤set the decline in the investment
rate as the capital inow expressed as a share of world GDP decreases. Lengthening the
working period also contributes to reducing the need for savings, thanks to a reduction
in the period of life without income from work when old. In addition, this longer working
period has a positive impact on the size of the labor force, which reduces the decline in
the return to capital as compared to a contribution increase. However, this increase is
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insu¢ cient to o¤set the decrease in the number of new workers. Similarly, the drop in
savings is not enough to o¤set the e¤ect of the decline in capital demand in the South.
As a consequence, the world interest rate decreases. In the end, the Southern economy
is always less dependent on incoming capital ows, regardless of the way its retirement
system is adjusted.
Finally, from the second period (t = 1) onwards, reducing the capital owing to the
South positively impacts the North, despite the decline in the interest rate. A smaller
world population makes it possible to produce and consume more (Fig. 3d). This is espe-
cially true in the South when the choice is made to work longer. In this case, the average
consumption level increases by 6% at steady state. Conversely, when the adjustment of
the pension schemes is done through the level of contribution, consumption increases by
only 4% at steady state, and even decreases a little during the rst two periods (this
reects the sharp fall in the interest rate during these periods).
3.3 The specic e¤ects of the mortality reduction
Similarly to what has just been examined for fertility, we study the specic e¤ects of
a mortality reduction by comparing the benchmark scenario with one assuming an un-
changed mortality.
The impact of the drop in mortality is twofold. First, as described before, it has a
direct impact on savings behavior in the South: with a constant lifecycle income, living
longer requires greater savings. Second, the increased number of retirees as compared to
workers requires an adjustment of the pension system to comply with the permanent 30%
replacement rate. In the case where the adjustment rests on higher contributions (Fig. 4,
left column), the contribution rate increases progressively to reach 15 percentage points as
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Figure 4: The specic e¤ects of mortality decline in the South depending on the retirement
system adjustment (GRR=30%)
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compared to the scenario with no mortality decline. Disposable income is then reduced,
though not enough to o¤set the increased savings needs: people in the South save more
with an unchanged labor force. Besides, on the world capital market, as the supply of
capital increases, the interest rate declines progressively to reach  0:25 percentage point.
In return, people in the North save less. Obviously capital ows to the South shrink, by
0:2 percentage point rst, then progressively by 0:45 percentage point as mortality goes
on declining in the South to reach the Norths level. The gain in longevity in the South
benets the North since more capital per worker is available, which boosts consumption
up to 1:5% at steady state.
On the other hand, consider that the retirement system adjustment is based on an
increase in the working period, which would progressively reach 17 percentage points
(Fig. 4, right column). So, the increase in the South labor force makes the capital more
protable and generates an additional demand for capital with respect to what prevails
in the contribution adjustment case. As evidenced by our simulation, the additional
supply of capital in the South induced by increased longevity is completely o¤set by
the additional demand for capital in the South, so that the world interest rate remains
unchanged. Note that the very weak change in the saving rate observed in the South
(Fig. 4b, right column) implies that individual savings evolve proportionally to GDP:
savri;t =
Ni;tSi;t
Yi;t
) savrS;t = 0, savS;tsavS;t =
YS;t
YS;t
. Accordingly, the capital ows as well
as consumption in the North remain unchanged as compared to the scenario with xed
mortality. From that perspective, an adjustment in the South retirement system through
an increase in the pension contribution rates would benet the North more than would
an adjustment through the legal retirement age, although with only a small gain (1:5% at
steady state). As the working period lengthens in the South, the increase in consumption
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over the life-cycle is about 30% stronger at steady state, as compared to 25% stronger in
case of a pure contribution adjustment (Fig. 4d). Interestingly enough, the lengthening
of the working period allows the annual consumption ow to stay put. This means that
consumption over the life-cycle increases by 30% at steady state due to the fact that life
expectancy increases by 30%. Also, if the retirement system is adjusted through higher
pension contributions, the annual consumption ow decreases by 5% at steady state.
4 Technological catching-up and capital ows: a ro-
bustness analysis
Previous simulations were made by assuming no technologial catching-up of the South
with the North. As a consequence, as observed in Fig. 5, the Souths GDP per capita
expressed relatively to the Norths, specied by6
YS;t
PopS;t
YN;t
PopN
=
AS;t
AN
1 +
lS;t
GS;t
1 + lN
1 + N
1 +
S;t
GS;t
  t (17)
where @ t
@GS;t
 0, @ t
@S;t
 0, and @ t
@lS;t
 0, decreases after opening. After peaking in
2010 at 25%, it re-reaches its former level as observed between 1960 and 2000, at around
18%, based on the population over 20 (see Appendix A). This is due to the simultaneous
decrease in fertility GS and increase in longevity s, whereas the increase in the South
working period lS is not su¢ cient to o¤set the demographic trend.
Contrasting with such a perspective, studies from Maddison (2008) and Wang et al.
(2011) tend to support that the South-North wealth gap will continue to narrow as ob-
served since the beginning of the 21st century. In our setting, as underlined by eq. (17),
6This ratio is independent of the pension contribution rates because their impact on savings modies
the accumulation of world capital but not the way it is distributed between the North and the South.
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Figure 5: Souths technological catch-up: past and forthcoming evolutions
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this narrowing requires a technological catching-up of the South with the North. Though
our paper does not focus on the Souths technological catch-up, it is worth testing our
results for robustness by considering di¤erent scenarios for the convergence speed.
To that e¤ect, the Souths technological catch-up is modelled according to the following
process: AS;t
AS;t 1
=

AN
AS;t 1
A
for t  1 with A < 1, where A measures the speed of
technological convergence. In our previous benchmarck scenario, A was set to zero to
have no TFP growth in the South, i.e. gAS ;t =
AS;t AS;t 1
AS;t 1
= 0 for all t  1. Now, we
contemplate a fast technological catch-up (A = 0:45) which mimics the GDP per capita
trends observed at the beginning of the 21st century (Fig. 5b). In this new scenario,
technological convergence is completed at the horizon of 2300 (period 10) and the TFP
in the South stops growing. Lastly, we investigate a slow technological catch-up scenario
(A = 0:1) in which only half of the technological gap has been lled at the same horizon
so that productivity continues to grow. As shown in Figure 6a, the TFP growth rate
with slow convergence becomes greater than the one prevailing in case of fast convergence
from period 57. As to the curves of world interest rate associated to the two speeds
of convergence, they exhibit similar shapes because their dynamics are linked to gAS ;t
through S;t. The return to capital under fast convergence is greater than otherwise until
the fth period (Fig. 6b).
Considering the capital ow towards the South, the technological catch-up exerts two
e¤ects on the Southern economy. First, it increases its attractivity on the world capital
market, which in turn pushes up the investment in the South. Second, the Souths devel-
opment due to catching-up increases the disposable income leading to higher households
7In the rst period, the TFP growth is increasing with the speed of convergence:
gAS;1
A

log

AN
AS;0

> 0. However, in the following periods, the TFP growth rate is decreasing more rapidly
towards 0 as the latter increases: gAS ;t+1  (1  A) gAS ;t for t  1.
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Figure 6: The benchmark scenario: sensitivity to the speed of catching-up
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of the e¤ects of the South demographic transition to the technological
catching-up speed
savings. The world market nancial tension is impacted by these two e¤ects in opposite
directions. However, the former e¤ect dominates the latter: both world interest rate and
capital ow towards the South increase with respect to a scenario without technological
convergence (Figs. 6b and 6c).
Let us now compare the impacts of the Souths demographic transition under the three
convergence scenarios. Figure 7 evidences the specic impacts of fertility and mortality
declines on return to capital and capital ows. Thus, as illustrated in Figures 7a and
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7c (left column for the latter), the interest rate drops caused by the fall in fertility or in
mortality are all stronger in the rst periods in case of fast technological catch-up.
Considering a fertility decline, the di¤erences in the levels of impact are only tempo-
rary. Indeed, at steady state, if there is no convergence in fertility, the North economy
becomes relatively negligible as compared to that of the Souths (the share of world pop-
ulation in the South tends to 100%).
As for a decrease in mortality, we observe that the intensity of its impact di¤ers, but
this di¤erence is permanent when the social security adjustment is exerted through the
pension contribution rate:  0:26 percentage point without catching-up at steady state,
 0:38 otherwise. Note that the fall in the interest rate is completely o¤set by the increase
in the working period. This general result obtains whatever the speed of technological
catch-up (Fig. 7c, right column).
Turn now to the impact on capital ows (Figs. 7b and 7d, left) when social security is
adjusted through the contribution rate. Considering a fertility decline (Fig. 7b, left), its
impact deserves particular attention because the speed of technological catch-up matters
qualitatively. The quicker the TFP growth, the weaker the relative variations of the
saving and investment rates. Then, in the rst periods, the decline in capital ows
directed to the South is smaller the faster the catching-up. Afterward, we observe that
the e¤ect can be reversed in case of a slow technological convergence. To understand
this e¤ect, consider formally what is precisely depicted in the above gures referenced
to: KFS(GS!1;AS!AN )
YW (GS!1;AS!AN )  
KFS(GS>1;AS!AN )
YW (GS>1;AS!AN ) . We know from the convergence processes that
KFS (GS ! 1; AS ! AN)! 0, and YW (GS > 1; AS ! AN)! +1. So both ratios tend
to zero, but at potentially di¤erent speeds. If the former goes to zero more quickly than the
latter, this measured di¤erence stays negative through the whole process. Since fertility
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convergence in our calibration is assumed to be rapid, this is what prevails when there
is no or fast technological catching-up. Conversely, the measured di¤erence can become
positive if the technological catch-up is slow.
Considering a mortality decline (Figs. 7d, left), at steady state, the reduction in
the capital ows goes from  0:47 percentage point with no catching-up to  0:16 point
otherwise.
If the adjustment of the pension scheme is achieved through postponing the legal
retirement age, the result obtained without catching-up remains consistent with techno-
logical catching-up: the additional supply of capital in the South generated by increased
longevity is completely o¤set by the additional demand for capital in the South (Fig. 7d,
right column).
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a tractable two-period two-region OLG model. It permits a thorough
analytical expression of the dynamics of the world interest rate and a clear exposition of
the underlying interactions between the di¤erent regional components of world equilib-
rium. That contributes to a better understanding of the main mechanisms triggered by
globalization. The advantages of our approach rooted in an analytical framework are
twofold. First, tractability allows us to evidence clear-cut transitory dynamics. Second,
it opens a path to possible investigations of general analytical properties of demographic
changes.
Thus, we show that a declining fertility or increasing longevity may have an ambigu-
ous impact on the direction of international capital ows. Although it triggers di¤erent
mechanisms, the decline in mortality or fertility leads to similar e¤ects, which result in
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a decrease in the need for capital. In the rst case, the e¤ect is induced mainly by an
initial decline in the growth of the labor force. In the second case, a longer life increases
incentives to save. Second, these initial changes may or may not be counterbalanced by
the adjustment of pension schemes that can reduce or expand incentives to save or in-
crease the labor force by delaying the legal retirement age, which in turn increases the
investment demand. Finally, the decline in regional nancial tensions a¤ects the world
interest rate, which in turn increases regional investment demands, which may increase
the investment rate in the South.
To clear up any ambiguity and to study the Souths demographic transition, which
involves a succession of shocks, the model is then calibrated on data characterizing the
economies of the North and the South. The simulations show that the demographic
transition tends, in a rather general way, to reduce the relative capital needs of the
economies of the South. This, in turn, generates benecial e¤ects for the economies
of the North, where the capital intensity and level of consumption are increased. The
overall result depends on the choice of adjustment to guarantee the balance of the pension
system. If delaying the legal retirement age is chosen to face an increased life expectancy,
the relative capital needs to remain unchanged. Also, the results are sensitive to the
development context. First, the magnitude of the initial impact of the demographic shock
is reduced with catching-up. Second, over a nite horizon, in case of slow catching-up,
the relative capital requirements in the South may also increase.
For future research, it is worth noting that the model has three main limitations. First,
supposing an exogenous labor supply implies it is harmless in terms of welfare to delay the
legal retirement age. In this perspective, this policy choice may appear misleadingly better
than its alternative, an increase in contributions. Second, global heterogeneity bears
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only on the demographic and productive dimensions. To extend the long-run realism
of the model, it would be wise to integrate other factors of production such as land
or non-renewable resources. Finally, the perfect market equilibrium assumptions could
be relaxed. For example, the model of Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) with rationed
nancial and labor markets, along with binding zero lower bound (ZLB), opens up new
research opportunities to study a global equilibrium with some economies potentially in
secular stagnation and to see how an asynchronous demographic transition could explain
some regional excess of savings and the very low rate of interest prevailing across many
countries at the moment.
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Appendix A. Data
Denition of the geographical areas North and South
Countries in the North (27 countries)
The countries belonging to the North are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK,
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, US.
Note that this denition of the North is similar to the one in Clements et al. (2011).
Countries in the South (170 countries)
The countries belonging to the South are all the countries of the World (197 countries,
United Nations) minus those belonging to the North (27 countries).
Sources
Demographic data: World Population Prospect. The 2015 Revision (United Nations,
2017), and authorscalculations.
First, we compute the population by age group j in each region (I = N; S) at date t as:
PopI;j;t =
P
i2I Popi;j;t, where Popi;j;t denotes the population by age group (of 5 years) in
country i at date t from the World Population Prospect. Note that, after 2015, we use the
data from the medium variant. Then, we can calculate the total population in each region
at date t, PopTI;t =
P
j PopI;j;t, the population over age 20, PopI;20;t =
P
j20 PopI;j;t,
and the demographic dependency ratio as DDRI;t =
P
j65 PopI;j;tP
65>j20 PopI;j;t
100. The population
growth at date t as given in Fig. 1-a2 is then obtained by gI;t =
PopTI;t PopTI;t 1
PopTI;t 1
 100,
and the demographic dependency ratio of the South to the North as given in Fig. 1-a3
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by DDRRS;t =
DDRS;t
DDRN;t
 100.
We also calculate the life expectancy LEI;j;t at age j and the fertility rate TFRI;t
in each region I at each date t. By simplicity, these are calculated in proportion to the
populations: LEI;j;t =
P
i2I LEi;j;tPopTi;t
PopTI;t
and TFRI;t =
P
i2I TFRi;tPopTi;t
PopTI;t
, where LEi;j;t
and TFRi;t denote respectively the life expectancy at age j and the total fertility rate in
country i at date t in the United Nations(2017) World Population Prospects. Fig 1-a1
depicts then the evolution of the relative life expectancy at birth in the South compared
to the North, LES;0;t
LEN;0;t
100, and likewise for the relative fertility rate in the South: TFRS;0;t
TFRN;0;t

100.
GDP per capita data: Penn World Table, version 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015), and
authorscalculations.
From the Penn World Table we compute the GDP per capita Y pcI;t (PWT ) in each
region at each date t according to: Y pcI;t (PWT ) =
P
i2I Yi;t(PWT )P
i2I PopTi;t(PWT )
, where Yi;t (PWT )
denotes the real GDP and PopTi;t (PWT ) the total population in country i at date
t. Then, we construct data in a 9-year moving average Y phI;t (PWT ), and we use
our demographic data to establish the GDP per capita for the population over age 20:
Y pcI;+20;t = Y phI;t (PWT )
PopI;t
PopI;20;t
. Finally, as given in Figure 5, the relative GDP per
capita in the South as compared to the North is  t =
Y pcS;+20;t
Y pcN;+20;t
 100.
Social security data: Clements et al. (2011), and authorscalculations.
As our denition of the North is the same as Clements et al. (2011), we can directly
use their data on the size of the North retirement system as a percentage of GDP (Fig.
1-b1). By contrast, as they focus only on emerging countries, we modify their data by
incorporating the sub-Saharian countries. In 2010, the size of the retirement system
amounted to AfSS;2010 = 0:7% of GDP in the latter (Marchiori, 2011). Accordingly, as
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their GDP represents 6% of the GDP of the South (authorscalculations based on Penn
World Table data) and as the size for the emerging countries calculated by Clements et al.
is Emerging;2010 = 4:2%, in 2010 we set that the social security size in the South is S;2010 =
0:06  AfSS;2010 + 0:94  Emerging;2010 = 4; 0%. Thereafter, as given in Fig. 1-b1, we
compute the evolution of the South social security size as: S;t = Emerging;t  	S;2010Emerging;2010 .
The relative evolution of the South social security size (Fig. 1-b2) is then obtained at
each date by
S;t
N;t
 100.
To get the gross replacement rate in percentage of the last wages , as given in Fig
1-b3, we rst assume a balanced budget, namely I;t =
I;t
DRI;t
, where DRI;t denotes the
dependency ratio and  I;t the pension contribution rate in each region I at each date t.
Then, assuming that capitals share in output is  = 0:3, this implies that  I;t =
I;t
1  =
I;t
0:7
, and we assume that DRI;t = DDRI;t. Note that this method enables us to obtain in
2010 in the North a gross replacement rate equal to 43:2%. To compare with an alternate
method, we have also calculated the gross replacement rate using the gross replacement
rates provided by the OECD in proportion to the GDP of the Northern countries, and we
obtain for the same year a rate equal to 42:2%.
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Appendix B. Proofs of the Propositions
Proposition 1
From eqs.(1), (8) (12) and (15) we have:
X
i
(Gi;t+1 + li;t+1)Ni;tki;t+1 =
X
i
Ni;tSi;t: (18)
From eq. (11), it follows that the wage and the capital per worker depend on the
world interest rate such that:
8>><>>:
wi;t = A
1
1 
i;t wt
ki;t = A
1
1 
i;t kt
(19)
where 8>><>>:
wt = (1  ) 1 R

 1
t  w (Rt)
kt = 
1
1 R
1
 1
t  k (Rt)
(20)
Introducing eqs. (8) and (19) into eq. (18) then yields:
X
i
Ni;t
 
Gi;t+1 + li;t+1 +
1 

(1  si;t)bi;t+1

A
1
1 
i;t+1k (Rt+1) (21)
=
X
i
Ni;tsi;t (1   i;t)A
1
1 
i;t w (Rt) :
Using eqs. (20) and (21), the dynamics of the world general equilibrium can be
specied as:
Rt+1 = R

t 
1 
t , R0 given
where t =
P
iNi;t([Gi;t+1+li;t+1]+(1 )(1 si;t)bi;t+1)A
1
1 
i;t+1P
iNi;tsi;t(1  i;t)(1 )A
1
1 
i;t
. This then yields straightforwardly
thatt can be rewritten ast =
P
i
[(Gi;t+1+li;t+1)+(1 )(1 si;t)bi;t+1]

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1 
si;t(1  i;t)(1 ) 
Ni;tP
i Ni;t
si;t(1  i;t)(1 )A
1
1 
i;tP
i
Ni;tP
i Ni;t
si;t(1  i;t)(1 )A
1
1 
i;t
,
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or equivalently
t = 'tS;t + (1  't) N;t
where 't =
sS;t(1 S;t)S;tA
1
1 
S;tP
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
and i;t =
Ni;tP
iNi;t
.
Proposition 2
From eqs. (11), (8) and (20), in an economy with fully integrated capital markets both
in period t and t + 1, this yields KFi;t = Li;t+1A
1
1 
i;t+1k (Rt+1)   Ni;tSi;t (Rt; Rt+1), where
Si;t (Rt; Rt+1)  si;t (1   i;t)A
1
1 
i;t w (Rt)  (1  si;t) bi;t+1 1  A
1
1 
i;t+1k (Rt+1).
By contrast, in an economy open in t but in autarky in t+1, it yields Li;t+1A
1
1 
i;t+1k

~Ri;t+1

=
Ni;tSi

Rt; ~Ri;t+1

.
We deduce that the capital ow in region i and in period t can be rewritten as:
KFi;t =

Li;t+1A
1
1 
i;t+1k (Rt+1) Ni;tSi;t (Rt; Rt+1)

 

Li;t+1A
1
1 
i;t+1k

~Ri;t+1

 Ni;tSi;t

Rt; ~Ri;t+1

=

Li;t+1 +Ni;t (1  si;t) bi;t+11  


A
1
1 
i;t+1
h
k (Rt+1)  k

~Ri;t+1
i
As k (:) is a decreasing function of the interest factor, we conclude that:
sign (KFi;t) = sign

~Ri;t+1  Rt+1

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Appendix C. Sensitivity of the world capital allocation
to demographic changes: the case of non-permanent
anticipated shocks
The demographic shocks directly impact the population size (consumers, workers and
retirees) and the life-cycle saving tradeo¤. They also convey many indirect e¤ects through
the institutional adjustment of pension systems and price changes on the domestic and
international markets.
To analyse their impacts on the world capital allocation at a regional level, it is
worth decomposing the e¤ects transiting through either the demand for capital, i.e. the
investment, or its supply, i.e. the savings, in each region. To that end, denote by invri;t =
Ki;t+1
Yi;t
; i = N; S, the macroeconomic investment rate in region i and in period t. As
ki;t+1 =
Ki;t+1
Li;t+1
, it follows according to eqs. (1), (12) and (19) that the saving rate can be
rewritten as invri;t =
A
1
1 
i;t+1k(Rt+1)(Gi;t+1+li;t+1)Ni;t
A
1
1 
i;t k
(Rt)
Gi;t+li;t
Gi;t
Ni;t
. Using eqs. (16) and (20), this also yields
invri;t =
Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t
(Gi;t+1 + li;t+1)

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1  
t
. Accordingly, this rate can be rewritten as
invri;t =
Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t
ginvri;t where the multiplier Gi;tGi;t+li;t is the share of young workers in the
total labor force and
ginvri;t = (Gi;t+1 + li;t+1)Ai;t+1Ai;t  11  t (22)
denotes the investment rate per young worker as a percentage of the added value per
worker.
Similarly, denote by savri;t =
Ni;tSi;t
Yi;t
the macroeconomic saving rate. From eqs. (1),
(8), (12) and (19), this yields savri;t =
si;t(1  i;t)A
1
1 
i;t w(Rt) (1 si;t)bi;t+1 1  A
1
1 
i;t+1k(Rt+1)
A
1
1 
i;t k
(Rt)
Gi;t+li;t
Gi;t
. Using
eqs. (16) and (20) allows us to rewrite the saving rate as savri;t =
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Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t

si;t (1   i;t) (1  )  (1  si;t) bi;t+1

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1  1 
t

. It can also be rewritten
as savri;t =
Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t
gsavri;t, where gsavri;t is the saving rate expressed in percentage of the
added value per worker:
gsavri;t = si;t (1   i;t) (1  )  (1  si;t) bi;t+1 Ai;t+1Ai;t  11  1 t : (23)
The net capital inow in a region i being dened as the di¤erence between the demand
and the supply of capital, i.e. KFi;t = (invri;t   savri;t)Yi;t, we can then express the ratio
KFri;t =
KFi;t
Yi;t
as:
KFri;t =
Gi;t
Gi;t + li;t
ginvri;t   gsavri;t (24)
Accordingly, the impact of the demographic changes on the international capital ows
can be split into three expressions:
KFri;t =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t

ginvri;t  gsavri;t
t=0
+
ginvri;t   gsavri;t Gi;tGi;t+li;t
9>>=>>; = KFri;tjt=0
  @KFri;t
@ 1
t
t
2t
(25)
where @KFri;t
@ 1
t
=
Gi;t
Gi;t+li;t
[(Gi;t+1 + li;t+1)+ (1  si;t) bi;t+1 (1  )]

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1 
> 0:
The two components of the rst expression measure the impact on the investment
and savings behaviors, expressed as a proportion of the added value per worker, assuming
a constant tension on the world capital market (t = 0). The following expression
measures the change in the young workersshare in the labor force. As a whole, these
two expressions result in a global impact, denoted KFri;tjt=0, characterizing a small
open economy. Indeed, as Rt+1 = Rt 
1 
t , considering t = 0 is equivalent to assuming
a constant interest rate in period t + 1, i.e. Rt+1 = 0. The last expression measures
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the intensity of the feedback e¤ect induced by the changes in the demand and supply of
capital in the world capital market. It depends on the variation of the tension indicator
t. t > 0 (resp. < 0) means a higher (resp. lower) nancial tension, inducing a
decrease (resp. an increase) in the capital-to-labor ratio. The variation of t captures the
international spillover e¤ects of a demographic change.
Note that ginvri;t   gsavri;t can be either positive or negative. However, for reasonable
parameters, it appears that S;t+j   N;t+j is positive for all j > 1 (see section 3) so
that, from Proposition 2, we can infer that capital ows from the North to the South.
Accordingly, the following assumption applies:
H1 : S;t+j   N;t+j > 0
C1. Negative fertility shock
Consider a negative non-permanent shock in fertility rate in the South in period t + 1,
GS;t+1 < 0, anticipated in period t. Before investigating its impact on the international
capital ows, it is crucial to underline that this shock requires in period t + 1 a social
security adjustment, because it means fewer workers pay for the pension benets. From
eq. (10), GS;t+1 < 0 implies in period t+ 1 a social security adjustment (SSA) through
either:
1. a pension contribution increase:
S;t+1 =   S;t+1
GS;t+1 + lS;t+1
GS;t+1 > 0; (26)
2. or a pension reduction:
S;t+1 =
S;t+1

S;t+1
  l
S;t+1
GS;t+1 < 0; (27)
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3. or the postponing of the legal retirement age:
lS;t+1 =   S;t+1
S;t+1 + S;t+1
GS;t+1 > 0: (28)
Considering these various possibilities, to disentangle the di¤erent channels through
which the fertility shock in the South impacts the South and the North, we consider in a
rst step the South as a small economy by assuming t = 0. In that case, the shock is
supposed to have no e¤ect on the North. In a second step, we consider the feedback e¤ects
induced by the changes in the demand and supply of capital in the world capital market
that a¤ect both the South and the North. We then review the capital accumulation at
the global level.
C1.1 The South as a small open economy
As specied in eq. (25), capital ows in the South are impacted through the change in
its investment, its savings or its young workersshare.
C1.1.1 Mathematics
a) ginvrS;t+j
t+j=0
From eq. (22), this yields in period t:
ginvrS;t = AS;t+1AS;t  11  t (GS;t+1 +lS;t+1) < 0:
With the rst two SSAs (eqs. 26 and 27), it follows that:
ginvrS;t
t=0;lS;t+1=0
=

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1  
t
GS;t+1 < 0:
With the third SSA (eq. 28), it is worth noting that the working population in-
creases, but not enough to o¤set the initial e¤ect: LS;t+1 = (GS;t+1 +lS;t+1)NS;t =
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
GS;t+1   S;t+1S;t+1+S;t+1GS;t+1

NS;t =
S;t+1
S;t+1+S;t+1
NS;tGS;t+1 < 0. Therefore, from eq.
(22), it follows that:
ginvrS;t
t=0;lS;t+1>0
=

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1  
t
S;t+1
S;t+1 + S;t+1
GS;t+1 < 0:
For other periods t+ j, j  1 :
ginvrS;t+j
t+j=0
= 0; 8j  1
b) gsavrS;t+jjt+j=0
From eq. (23), it yields in period t:
gsavrS;t =   (1  sS;t)AS;t+1AS;t  11  1 t bS;t+1
where from eqs. (7) and (10) bi;t+1 = li;t+1 +Gi;t+1 i;t+1 and then:
 with eq. (26) bS;t+1 = S;t+1GS;t+1 +GS;t+1S;t+1
= S;t+1

1  GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

GS;t+1 < 0;
 with eq. (27) bS;t+1 = S;t+1GS;t+1 < 0;
 with eq. (28) bS;t+1 = li;t+1 + S;t+1GS;t+1 = S;t+1

S;t+1 (1 S;t+1)
S;t+1+S;t+1

GS;t+1.
In that case, bS;t+1 < 0, S;t+1(1 S;t+1) > 1.
The rst two SSAs (eqs. 26 and 27) reduce householdsexpected future income when
old, yielding the current saving rate to increase:
bS;t+1jt=0;lS;t+1=0 < 0, gsavrS;tjt=0;lS;t+1=0 > 0:
The impact of the third SSA (eq. 28) depends on the gap between the net wage and
pension, a function of (1  S;t+1)   S;t+1, or the pension net replacement rate, dened
by S;t+1
(1 S;t+1)
.
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From eq. (23), this yields in period t+ 1:
gsavrS;t+1 =  sS;t+1 (1  )S;t+1
and then according to eqs. (26) - (28):
gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1>0 < 0
gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1=0 = 0
In period t+ j, j > 1, eq. (23) yields:
gsavrS;t+jjt+j=0 = 0; 8j > 1
c)  GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j

GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j
=
lS;t+j
(GS;t+j+lS;t+j)
2GS;t+j   GS;t+j
(GS;t+j+lS;t+j)
2lS;t+j
The fertility drop reduces the share of the young workers in period t + 1 but not in
periods t and t+ j for j > 1:
8>><>>:

GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j
< 0 if j = 1


GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j

= 0 if j = 0 or j > 1
If the social security adjustment consists in postponing the legal retirement age (eq.
28), the reduction in t+ 1 is amplied.
C1.1.2 Analysis
Table C1.1 summarizes the domestic e¤ects for the current (t) and next (t + 1) periods
when the world nancial tension is supposed unchanged (small open economy). In the
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South, the negative fertility shock in t results rst in a reduction in the labor force of
the next period, even if the retirement age is postponed as specied in the third social
security adjustment. As a consequence, whatever the social security adjustment, the
marginal productivity of capital is reduced in t + 1, which explains the investment rate
decline in period t: ginvrS;t < 0. As the fertility rate returns to its initial level in
period t+2, the shock has no e¤ect on the investment rate from the period t+1 onward:
ginvrS;t+j = 0; j  1.
As to the saving rate, it must be noted that individual income is a¤ected di¤erently
by the negative fertility shock depending on the social security adjustment. Indeed, if the
social security adjustment does not entail a lengthening of the working period in t+1, the
fertility shock in period t results in a lower income when old in t+1: bS;t+1jt=0;lS;t+1=0
< 0. As a result, the current saving rate increases: gsavrS;tjt=0;lS;t+1=0 > 0. On the
other hand, the impact of the third adjustment depends on the gap between the net wage
and pension, tied to (1  S;t+1)  S;t+1: If the pension net replacement rate, dened by
S;t+1
1 S;t+1 ; is greater (resp. lesser) than 1, the saving rate is increased (resp. decreased).
For reasonable parameters (see section 3) it appears that this ratio is less than 1, hence
we assume:
H2 :
S;t+1
1  S;t+1 < 1
so that gsavrS;tjt=0;lS;t+1>0 < 0. Considering the next period saving rate, the adjust-
ment through the pension contribution rate reduces the net wage of future young workers,
which in turn leads to a contraction of the future saving rate gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1>0
< 0. In the other cases, the fertility shock has no impact on the saving rate:
gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1=0 = 0. Note that, in case the future fertility shock is unex-
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pected, only this saving impact will occur.
Finally, the fertility drop reduces the share of the young workers in period t + 1
(

GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

< 0) but not in periods t + j for j 6= 1: This reduction is amplied if
the legal retirement age is postponed. Assuming by H1 that ginvrS;t+j   gsavrS;t+j > 0, it
then yields
ginvrS;t+j   gsavrS;t+j Gi;t+j
Gi;t+j + li;t+j
8>><>>:
< 0 if j = 1
= 0 otherwise
According to assumptions H1 and H2, the net result measured by KFrS;t+jjt+j=0
is clearcut in most of the cases and highlights the decline in capital ows entering the
South as a result of declining fertility. However, when the legal retirement age is postponed
and when the contribution rate is increased the net impact is indeterminate in periods t
and t+ 1 respectively.
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Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
GS;t
GS;t+lS;t
ginvrS;t
t=0
     
GS;t
GS;t+lS;t
   gsavrS;tjt=0     + (H2) or  ginvrS;t   gsavrS;t GS;tGS;t+lS;t 0 0 0
KFrS;tjt=0     ? (H2) or  
a. Period t
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1
ginvrS;t+1
t+1=0
0 0 0
GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

  gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0 + 0 0ginvrS;t+1   gsavrS;t+1 GS;t+1GS;t+1+lS;t+1   (H1) or +   (H1) or +   (H1) or +
KFrS;t+1jt+1=0 ? (H1) or +   (H1) or +   (H1) or +
b. Period t+ 1
Table C1.1 - Negative fertility shock in t+ 1 (GS;t+1 < 0) :
South domestic impact (small open economy)
C1.2 The spillover e¤ects and the North
The above small open economy hypothesis goes with the assumption that the South demo-
economic weight is insignicant, i.e. 't+j  0. In that case, as t = 'tS;t+(1  't) N;t,
a change in the South nancial tension entails no signicant change at the world market
level: t+j  0 even if S;t+j 6= 0. Relaxing the small open economy hypothesis
requires then to take into account the impact of the fertility shock on the world nancial
market. As specied by the following equation, this impact decomposes into two distinct
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e¤ects:
t+j = 't+jS;t+j +'t+j (S;t+j   N;t+j) : (29)
The rst term measures the change in nancial tension in the South, while the second
term measures the change in the South demo-economic weight.
C1.2.1 Mathematics
a) S;t+j
In period t, S;t =
[(GS;t+1+lS;t+1)+(1 )(1 sS;t)(lS;t+1+GS;t+1S;t+1)]

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
and it fol-
lows that:
S;t =
@S;t
@GS;t+1
GS;t+1 +
@S;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1 +
@S;t
@lS;t+1
lS;t+1
where @S;t
@GS;t+1
=
[+(1 )(1 sS;t)S;t+1]

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
> 0;
@S;t
@S;t+1
=
(1 )(1 sS;t)GS;t+1

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
> 0;
@S;t
@lS;t+1
=
[+(1 )(1 sS;t)]

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
> 0:
Accordingly:
 with eq. (27), S;t = @S;t@GS;t+1GS;t+1 < 0;
 with eq. (26), S;t = @S;t@GS;t+1GS;t+1 +
@S;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1
=

+(1 )(1 sS;t)S;t+1

1  GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
GS;t+1 < 0;
 with eq. (28), S;t = @S;t@GS;t+1GS;t+1 +
@S;t
@lS;t+1
lS;t+1
=


S;t+1
S;t+1+S;t+1
+(1 )(1 sS;t)
S;t+1
S;t+1+S;t+1
[S;t+1 (1 S;t+1)]

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
GS;t+1 > 0.
In this case, S;t > 0, S;t+1

1 S;t+1
S;t+1
  1

> 
(1 sS;t)(1 )
,

ginvri;t  gsavri;t
t=0;lS;t+1>0
> 0
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Note that, by dening X = (GS;t+1 + lS;t+1)

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
, Y = sS;t (1  S;t) (1  ),
Z = (1  sS;t) bS;t+1

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
(1  ), we can rewrite ginvri;t = Xt and gsavri;t = Y   Zt ,
and it follows that:

ginvrS;t  gsavrS;t
t=0
=
X +Z
t
 Y
On the other hand, S;t = X+ZY and then S;t =
X+Z
Y
  Y
Y
X+Z
Y
. As Y = 0, we
can verify in period t that S;t = tY

ginvrS;t  gsavrS;t
t=0
.
In period t + 1, S;t+1 =
[(GS;t+2+lS;t+2)+(1 )(1 sS;t+1)(lS;t+2+GS;t+2S;t+2)]

AS;t+2
AS;t+1
 1
1 
sS;t+1(1 S;t+1)(1 )
which yields:
S;t+1 =
@S;t+1
@S;t+1
S;t+1
8>><>>:
> 0 , S;t+1 > 0
= 0 , S;t+1 = 0
where @S;t+1
@S;t+1
=
[(GS;t+2+lS;t+2)+(1 )(1 sS;t+1)(lS;t+2+GS;t+2S;t+2)]

AS;t+2
AS;t+1
 1
1 
sS;t+1(1 )
[sS;t+1(1 S;t+1)(1 )]2
=
S;t+1
1 S;t+1 > 0:
In period t+ j for j > 1; S;t+j = 0:
b) 't+j (S;t+j   N;t+j)
As 't+j =
sS;t+j(1 S;t+j)S;t+jA
1
1 
S;t+jP
i si;t(1  i;t+j)i;t+jA
1
1 
i;t+j
, we can infer that in period t the South demo-
economic weight does not change:
't = 0
Otherwise, di¤erentiating 't+j in period t+ 1 yields:
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't+1 =
@'t+1
@S;t+1
S;t+1 +
@'t+1
@S;t+1
S;t+1
and for all the other periods t+ j for j > 1:
't+j =
@'t+j
@S;t+j
S;t+j
To determine the sense of variation of 't+j for j  1, we derive rst
@'t+j
@S;t+j
=
sS;t+j(1 S;t+j)A
1
1 
S;t+j

sN;t+j(1 N;t+j)N;t+jA
1
1 
N;t+j

P
i si;t+j(1  i;t+j)i;t+jA
1
1 
i;t+j
2 or equivalently:
@'t+j
@S;t+j
=
't+j
 
1  't+j

S;t+j
> 0
Secondly, @'t+1
@S;t+1
=
 sS;t+1S;t+1A
1
1 
S;t+1

sN;t+1(1 N;t+1)N;t+1A
1
1 
N;t+1

P
i si;t+1(1  i;t+1)i;t+1A
1
1 
i;t+1
2 or:
@'t+1
@S;t+1
=
 't+1
 
1  't+1

(1  S;t+1) < 0
Besides, as S;t+j =
NS;t+jP
iNi;t+j
, it follows that S;t+j =
NN;t+j
(
P
iNi;t+j)
2NS;t+j or equivalently:
S;t+j = S;t+j (1  S;t+j) NS;t+j
NS;t+j
From eq. (1), NS;t+j =
Qj
k=1GS;t+kNS;t yields logNS;t+j =
Pj
k=1 logGS;t+k+logNS;t and:
NS;t+j
NS;t+j
  logNS;t+j  GS;t+1
GS;t+1
< 0, 8t  1:
To summarize, this then yields that:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
't = 0
't+1 = 't+1
 
1  't+1

(1  S;t+1) GS;t+1GS;t+1  
't+1(1 't+1)
(1 S;t+1)
S;t+1 < 0
't+j = 't+j
 
1  't+j

(1  S;t+j) GS;t+1GS;t+1 < 0, 8j > 1
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and then that:
H1) 't+j (S;t+j   N;t+j) < 0 8j  1
C1.2.2 Analysis
In period t, the changes in the tension in South domestic capital demand can be derived
from the previous analyses. Indeed, it can be shown that
S;t =
t
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )

ginvrS;t  gsavrS;t
t=0
. Since, as long as the retirement
age stays put, nancial tension in the South is decreased by the negative fertility shock:
S;tjlS;t+1=0 < 0. As described in Table C1.1, either increased contributions or de-
creased pensions lead to both a lower investment rate and a higher saving rate. By
contrast, a delayed retirement age, under assumption H2, decreases the saving rate, and
the change in the South domestic tension is now indeterminate. In the period immedi-
ately preceding the shock, the South demo-economic weight is not impacted: 't = 0.
As highlighted in Table C1.2, the global e¤ect in period t is then expressed solely by the
change in the South nancial tension S;t.
Conversely, in period t+ 1, unless the social security adjustment is operated through
the contribution rate, the nancial tension in the South is no longer impacted by the
fertility shock: S;t+1jS;t+1=0 = 0. Only if the contribution rate increases does the
saving rate decrease so that this tension grows: S;t+1jS;t+1>0 > 0. On the other hand,
from period t+1, the negative transitory fertility shock in the South will have a permanent
negative e¤ect on its population share in the world. The South demo-economic weight is
then permanently impacted so that 't+j < 0 for all j  1. Assuming a stronger tension
in the South than in the North (H1) yields 't+j (S;t+j   N;t+j) < 0. So, unless a
social security adjustment goes with a higher contribution rate, nancial tension at the
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world level is reduced in period t+ 1 (see Table C1.2).
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
'tS;t     ? (H2) or  
't (S;t   N;t) 0 0 0
t     ? (H2) or  
KFrN;t + + ? (H2) or +
KFrS;t     ? (H2) or  
a. Period t
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
't+1S;t+1 + 0 0
't+1 (S;t+1   N;t+1)   (H1) or +   (H1) or +   (H1) or +
t+1 ? (H1) or +   (H1) or +   (H1) or +
KFrN;t+1 ? (H1) or   + (H1) or   + (H1) or  
KFrS;t+1 ? ? ?
b. Period t+ 1
Table C1.2 - Negative fertility shock in t+ 1 (GS;t+1 < 0) :
The spillover e¤ects
Through the impact on tension on the world capital market, the fertility shock in
the South spills over to the North such that, according to equation (25), KFrN;t+j =
 @KFrN;t+j
@ 1
t+j
t+j
2t+j
. Therefore, when it is determinate and according to our assumptions,
the negative fertility shock in the South in period t+1; by entailing a lower world nancial
tension in periods t and t+1 (see Table C1.2), leads toKFrN;t+j =  @KFrN;t+j@ 1
t+j
t+j
2t+j
> 0
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if t+j < 0, for j = 0; 1.
C1.3 Overall impact in the South and the world capital
By a¤ecting the world interest rate, the spillover e¤ects also bear consequences in the
South, inducing an increase in its investment rate and a decrease in its saving rate when
t < 0. The overall e¤ect in the South obtained from eq. (25) is then indeterminate.
To test whether the overall e¤ect of the negative fertility shock on the relative South
capital ows is truly indeterminate, one may also consider the following relation KFS;t+j
YS;t+j
=
 YN;t+j
YS;t+j
KFN;t+j
YN;t+j
(as it is obvious that
P
iKFi;t = 0) such that:
KFrS;t+j
KFrS;t+j
=
KFrN;t+j
KFrN;t+j
+ 
YN;t+j
YS;t+j

YN;t+j
YS;t+j
(30)
where YN;t+j
YS;t+j
=

AN;t+j
AS;t+j
 1
1  LN;t+j
LS;t+j
.
In period t, YN;t
YS;t
= 0 and it follows that KFrS;t
KFrS;t
=
KFrN;t
KFrN;t
< 0 by assuming H1
(KFrS;t > 0 andKFrN;t < 0). We can deduce that in this period, the spillover e¤ects con-
veyed through the variation of the interest rate reduce the e¤ect acknowledged in the small
open economy without altering its sense of variation: jKFrS;tj <
KFrS;tjt=0 and
sign (KFrS;t) = sign
 
KFrS;tjt=0

. This result depends on the channel through
which the international nancial tension is a¤ected, i.e. a change in the South regional
tension: t = 'tS;t. However, by denition, if the South was in autarky, its domestic
feedback would be measured by S;t implying KFrS;t = 0. This means that in the
international context here considered, the spillover e¤ects in the South are not su¢ cient
to totally o¤set the small-open-economy e¤ect: jtj < jS;tj.
Di¤erently, in period t+1, unlessS;t+1 > 0, the South regional tension is una¤ected,
i.e. S;t+1 = 0. Hence, the spillover e¤ects do not depend on it but are still linked
63
to the demo-economic weight of the South. As can be seen in eq. (30), KFrS;t+1
KFrS;t+1
=
KFrN;t+1
KFrN;t+1
+

YN;t+1
YS;t+1
YN;t+1
YS;t+1
, where KFrN;t+1
KFrN;t+1
< 0 if assuming H1 and S;t+1 = 0, whereas

YN;t+1
YS;t+1
YN;t+1
YS;t+1
> 0 (labor in the South is always decreased by the negative fertility shock, even
if the legal retirement age is postponed). By a denominator e¤ect, we can no longer
assert that the capital ow-to-GDP ratio in the South systematically changes in the same
direction as its counterpart in a small open economy. It is then indeterminate.
Note that in our simulations, in order to compare the capital ows from the di¤erent
regions directly, we consider the ows with respect to the world GDP instead of the
regional GDPs, such that KFS;t
YS;t+YN;t
=   KFN;t
YS;t+YN;t
. However, as

KFN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
KFN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
=
KFrN;t+1
KFrN;t+1
+

YN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
YN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
, where

YN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
YN;t+1
YS;t+1+YN;t+1
> 0, using this ratio does not help to clear up the
analytical indeterminacy evidenced in period t+ 1 in the South.
C2. Positive longevity shock
Consider now in period t + 1 a positive non-permanent shock in life expectancy in the
South, S;t+1 > 0, anticipated in period t: As this entails more pensioners, this shock
requires a social security adjustment. From eq. (10), S;t+1 > 0 implies in period t+ 1
a social security adjustment through either:
1. a pension contribution increase:
S;t+1 =
S;t+1
S;t+1   lS;t+1
S;t+1 > 0; (31)
2. or a pension reduction:
S;t+1 =   S;t+1S;t+1 lS;t+1S;t+1 < 0; (32)
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3. or the postponing of the legal retirement age:
lS;t+1 =
S;t+1
S;t+1 + S;t+1
S;t+1 > 0: (33)
To assess the impact of this shock, we proceed similarly as for the fertility shock. First,
we consider the South as a small open economy. Then, we consider the feedback e¤ects
induced by the changes in the demand and supply of capital in the world capital market,
and we nally review the changes in capital ows in the North and the South.
C2.1 The South as a small open economy
C2.1.1 Mathematics
a) ginvrS;t+j
t+j=0
From eq. (22), this yields:
ginvrS;t+j = Ai;t+j+1Ai;t+j  11  t+jlS;t+j+1:
With the rst two SSAs (eqs. 31 and 32), it follows that:
ginvrS;t+j
t+j=0;lS;t+j+1=0
= 0; 8j
With the third SSA (eq. 33):
ginvrS;t
t=0;lS;t+1>0
=

Ai;t+1
Ai;t
 1
1  
t
S;t+1
S;t+1 + S;t+1
S;t+1 > 0:
ginvrS;t+j
t+j=0;lS;t+1>0
= 0; 8j  1
b) gsavrS;t+jjt+j=0
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From eq. (23), it follows in period t:
gsavrS;t = (1  ) (1  S;t) + bS;t+1 AS;t+1AS;t  11  1 t

@sS;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1
  (1  sS;t)

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1  1 
t
bS;t+1
(34)
where @sS;t
@S;t+1
= 
(1+S;t+1)
2 =
sS;t(1 sS;t)
S;t+1
> 0 and bS;t+1 = lS;t+1 + GS;t+1S;t+1, and
then:
 with eq. (31), bS;t+1 = GS;t+1S;t+1 = GS;t+1 S;t+1S;t+1 lS;t+1S;t+1 > 0
 with eq. (32), bS;t+1 = 0;
 with eq. (33), bS;t+1 = lS;t+1 = S;t+1S;t+1+S;t+1S;t+1 > 0.
Accordingly, from eq. (34) this yields:
gsavrS;tjt=0;S;t+1<0 > 0
In the other cases (S;t+1 > 0 or lS;t+1 > 0), the sign of gsavrS;t is indeterminate in
period t.
From eq. (23), it follows in period t+ 1:
gsavrS;t+1 =  sS;t+1 (1  )S;t+1
and then:
gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1>0 < 0
gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0;S;t+1=0 = 0
In period t+ j, j > 1:
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gsavrS;t+jjt+j=0 = 0; 8j > 1
c)  GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j
Di¤erentiating GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j
leads to  GS;t+j
GS;t+j+lS;t+j
=   GS;t+j
(GS;t+j+lS;t+j)
2lS;t+j.
Then, increased longevity in t + 1 has no e¤ect on the share of the young workers in
period t+ 1 unless the legal retirement age is postponed:

GS;t+1
GS;t+1 + lS;t+1
8>><>>:
< 0 , lS;t+1 > 0
= 0 , lS;t+1 = 0
For the other periods t+ j, j = 0 or j > 1; the impact is nil.
C2.1.2 Analysis
As exhibited by eq. (8), for young domestic households in period t, the positive longevity
shock that will occur in period t + 1 modies in two ways their saving choice to sus-
tain their consumption when old. First, it requires a higher saving e¤ort (sS;t > 0).
Second, as the future net income increases if social security is adjusted through the con-
tribution rate or postponement of the legal retirement age (bS;t+1 > 0), it lowers the
incentive to save. In these two cases, the responsiveness of savings is indeterminate in
period t. In the last (third) case, the pension is reduced (S;t+1 < 0) but received for
longer such that bS;t+1 = 0; only the rst e¤ect matters, and savings is then increased:
gsavrS;tjt=0;S;t+1<0 > 0. As before, solely a contribution adjustment reduces the
saving rate in period t+ 1:
The positive longevity shock has no direct impact on the investment rate. Therefore,
the latter upgrades only in period t if labor is increased through the postponement of the
legal retirement age in period t+1. Also, in this case, the young workersshare in period
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t+1 is decreased, 

GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

< 0, whereas it stays unchanged for the other periods
t+ j, j = 0 and j > 1.
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
GS;t
GS;t+lS;t
ginvrS;t
t=0
0 0 +
GS;t
GS;t+lS;t
   gsavrS;tjt=0 ?   ?ginvrS;t   gsavrS;t GS;tGS;t+lS;t 0 0 0
KFrS;tjt=0 ?   ?
a. Period t
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1
ginvrS;t+1
t+1=0
0 0 0
GS;t+1
GS;t+1+lS;t+1

  gsavrS;t+1jt+1=0 + 0 0ginvrS;t+1   gsavrS;t+1 GS;t+1GS;t+1+lS;t+1 0 0   (H1) or +
KFrS;t+1jt+1=0 + 0   (H1) or +
b. Period t+ 1
Table C2.1 - Positive longevity shock in t+ 1
 
S;t+1 > 0

:
South domestic impact (small open economy)
Taking all these e¤ects into account, as reported in Table C2.1, it appears that the
impact of the positive longevity shock in the South on the relative capital ow may be
di¤erent, depending on the social security adjustment and the period. Hence, in period
t, the e¤ect is unambiguously negative only if pensions are reduced. In period t + 1,
the impact is positive if the contribution rate is increased, negative (under H1) if the
retirement age is postponed, or nil if pensions are decreased.
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C2.2 The spillover e¤ects
The channels through which the world capital market is a¤ected by the longevity shock in
the South are the same as for the fertility shock, i.e. the changes in the domestic tension
in the South S;t and in its demo-economic weight 't as specied in eq. (29).
C2.2.1 Mathematics
a) S;t+j
Di¤erentiating S;t =
[(GS;t+1+lS;t+1)+(1 )(1 sS;t)(lS;t+1+GS;t+1S;t+1)]

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
sS;t(1 S;t)(1 )
gives:
S;t =
@S;t
@sS;t
@sS;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1 +
@S;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1 +
@S;t
@lS;t+1
lS;t+1
where @sS;t
@S;t+1
> 0, @S;t
@S;t+1
> 0, @S;t
@lS;t+1
> 0 (see the fertility shock) and @S;t
@sS;t
=
 (
(1 )(lS;t+1+GS;t+1S;t+1)sS;t+[(GS;t+1+lS;t+1)+(1 )(1 sS;t)(lS;t+1+GS;t+1S;t+1)])

AS;t+1
AS;t
 1
1 
s2S;t(1 S;t)(1 )
< 0.
It follows that the sign ofS;t is only determinate if the SSA implies less pension benets
such that:
S;t
8>><>>:
< 0 , S;t+1 < 0
? , S;t+1 = 0
In period t+ 1:
S;t+1 =
@S;t+1
@S;t+1
S;t+1
8>><>>:
> 0 , S;t+1 > 0
= 0 , S;t+1 = 0
where @S;t+1
@S;t+1
> 0 (see the fertility shock):
b) 't+j (S;t+j   N;t+j)
In period t, di¤erentiating 't =
sS;t(1 S;t)S;tA
1
1 
S;tP
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
leads to:
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't =
@'t
@sS;t
@sS;t
@S;t+1
S;t+1 > 0
where @'t
@sS;t
=
(1 S;t)S;tA
1
1 
S;t

sN;t(1 N;t)N;tA
1
1 
N;t

P
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
2 = 't(1 't)sS;t > 0 and @sS;t@S;t+1 = (1+i;t+1)2 =
sS;t(1 sS;t)
S;t+1
> 0.
In period t+ 1, one gets:
't+1 =
@'t+1
@S;t+1
S;t+1
where @'t+1
@S;t+1
=  
sS;tS;tA
1
1 
S;t

sN;t(1 N;t)N;tA
1
1 
N;t

P
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
2 =  't(1 't)(1 S;t) < 0. It follows that:
't+1
8>><>>:
< 0 , S;t+1 > 0
= 0 , S;t+1 = 0
In period t+ j, j > 1:
't+j = 0
c) tjS;t+1<0
Note that, in period t, as the result of indeterminate or opposing e¤ects, the sense
of variation of the spillover e¤ect seems massively indeterminate. However, if consider-
ing the following specication t =
P
iNi;t([Gi;t+1+li;t+1]+(1 )(1 si;t)[li;t+1+Gi;t+1 i;t+1])A
1
1 
i;t+1P
iNi;tsi;t(1  i;t)(1 )A
1
1 
i;t
,
if pensions are lowered (eq. 32), and only in this case, the indeterminacy clears up such
that the dominant e¤ect is always brought through the South domestic tension:
tjS;t+1<0
t
=  
8>>><>>>:
NS;t(1 )[lS;t+1+GS;t+1S;t+1]A
1
1 
S;t+1P
iNi;t([Gi;t+1+li;t+1]+(1 )(1 si;t)[li;t+1+Gi;t+1 i;t+1])A
1
1 
i;t+1
+tNS;t (1  S;t) (1  )A
1
1 
S;t
9>>>=>>>;
@sS;t
@S;t+1
< 0
70
C2.2.2 Analysis
In period t, as the change in the saving rate is indeterminate if social security is adjusted
through contributions or the legal retirement age, the change in the domestic tension in
the South is also indeterminate. Only if the social security adjustment goes with less
pension benets, as savings hence capital supply are increased, do we know that the
domestic tension is lowered in the South. In period t + 1, for the same reason as for
the negative fertility shock, the domestic tension is impacted and increased only if the
contribution rate is increased.
Contrary to the fertility shock, the South demo-economic weight is impacted and
increased as early as period t by the positive longevity shock through the savings channel:
't > 0. Under assumption H1, it follows that 't (S;t   N;t) > 0. From period t+1
on, unless the social security adjustment yields an increase in contributions characterized
by @'t+1
@S;t+1
=
 't+1(1 't+1)
(1 S;t+1)
< 0, the demo-economic weight of the South is no longer a¤ected
by the longevity shock, 't+1

S;t+1=0
= 't+j; j>1 = 0, reecting the transitory nature
of a longevity shock on demographics, unlike a fertility shock.
71
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
'tS;t ?   ?
't (S;t   N;t) + (H1) or   + (H1) or   + (H1) or  
t ?   ?
KFrN;t ? + ?
KFrS;t ?   ?
a. Period t
Sense of Social security adjustment
variation S;t+1 > 0 S;t+1 < 0 lS;t+1 > 0
't+1S;t+1 + 0 0
't+1 (S;t+1   N;t+1)   (H1) or + 0 0
t+1 ? (H1) or + 0 0
KFrN;t+1 ? (H1) or   0 0
KFrS;t+1 ? (H1) or + 0   (H1) or +
b. Period t+ 1
Table C2.2 - Positive longevity shock in t+ 1
 
S;t+1 > 0

:
The spillover e¤ect
Table C2.2 summarizes the net e¤ect of each impact for the current and next period.
In period t, as the result of indeterminate or opposing e¤ects, the sense of variation of
the spillover e¤ect may appear massively indeterminate. However, it can be shown that
if pensions are lowered, the dominant e¤ect always passes through the South domestic
tension so that tjS;t+1<0 < 0. Only in this case can we assert, under H1, that the
capital ows from the North to the South expressed relatively to North GDP decrease in
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period t: KFrN;tjS;t+1<0 > 0. In period t+1, if the social security adjustment does not
entail a higher contribution rate, the world nancial tension stays unchanged, as do the
capital ows with respect to North GDP: t+1jS;t+1=0 = KFrN;t+1jS;t+1=0 = 0. In
the opposite case, the variation of the world nancial tension is indeterminate under H1.
C2.3 Overall impact in the South
In period t, as for the fertility shock, the global e¤ect of a positive longevity shock in the
South can be obtained by eq. (30). As labor in the South is not impacted, the change in
the relative capital ows in the South is always of the opposite sign to the change in the
relative capital ows in the North: KFrS;t
KFrS;t
=
KFrN;t
KFrN;t
, where KFrS;t > 0 and KFrN;t < 0
according to H1.
In period t + 1, if the social security adjustment entails a higher contribution rate,
the e¤ect is globally indeterminate, both in the North, as already seen, and in the South.
By contrast, otherwise, as there is no spillover e¤ect, the global e¤ect in the South is
the same as the one prevailing in the small open economy, i.e. none if a social security
adjustment entails less pension benets, or less capital ows entering expressed relatively
to GDP if the legal age of retirement is postponed. Note that, in the latter case, the
e¤ect is a pure denominator e¤ect: the ows stay unchanged but South GDP increases
thanks to more available labor. As KFrN;t+1 = 0, we can verify from eq. (30) that
KFrS;t+1
KFrS;t+1
=

YN;t+1
YS;t+1
YN;t+1
YS;t+1
=  YS;t+1
YS;t+1
< 0:
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